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I. INTRODUCTION

Many American high school graduates face a difficult choice:
They can pursue higher education and the higher earnings it provides,
but that means taking on debt that it may take them decades to pay
225

226
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back. Or they can forego a college degree and its attendant debt but be
stuck earning lower wages for their entire lives. For many of these
students, there is no viable third option.
From an early age, many Americans have been told about the
value of a college degree-without one, finding a job is difficult and
lifetime income is severely depressed. Data relating educational
attainment to unemployment rates and wages indicate that these
assertions are probably true. In 2013, the unemployment rate for those
with a high school diploma was nearly double that of Americans with
bachelor's degrees, and persons without a high school diploma were
almost three times as likely to be unemployed as college graduates.'
Educational attainment also relates directly to earnings. In 2013,
median earnings for persons with bachelor's degrees were $1,108 per
week, while workers with only a high school diploma and those without
a diploma earned $651 and $472, respectively. 2 The highest earners are
those with professional degrees, who earned a median $1,714 per week
in 2013, for an annual salary just over $90,000.3
Thus, for many Americans, seeking higher education has a
foreseeable financial benefit. However, especially as the costs of higher
education increase, many students and their families find themselves
lacking sufficient capital to finance their educations. Between the
academic years beginning in 2003 and 2013, the average annual tuition
and fees for a four-year undergraduate degree have increased twentyfive percent for private nonprofit institutions and over fifty percent for
public institutions. 4 The Center for American Progress reports that the
cost of higher education has increased more than one thousand percent
since 1980, about ten times the increase in the Consumer Price Index

1.
Earnings and Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep-table-001.htm (last updated Mar. 24, 2014) (finding that
the unemployment rate in 2013 was four percent for Americans with bachelor's degrees, 7.5
percent for those with a high school diploma, and eleven percent for those without a high school
diploma).
2.
Id. This translates to a median annual salary of $24,072 for those without a diploma,
assuming a fifty-two week work year. In 2013, the poverty line for a family of four was $23,550 in
the contiguous United States. 2013 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/13poverty.cfm (last updated Jan. 24, 2013).
3.
Earningsand Unemployment Rates by EducationalAttainment, supra note 1. Doctoraldegree holders had the lowest unemployment rate at 2.2 percent, while 2.3 percent of professional
degree holders were unemployed. Id.
4.
See COLL. BD., TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2013, at 15 (2013), available at
http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/college-pricing-2013-full-report.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/3WXK-ELS4 (describing changes in college costs over time and adjusting for
inflation).
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during the same period.5 The amount of student borrowing has risen
accordingly, increasing approximately six percent per year between
2008 and 2012, from an average of $23,450 per borrower in 2008 to
$29,400 in 2012.6 The Institute for College Access and Success found
that, in 2012, seventy-one percent of graduating students used loans to
finance at least a part of their college educations. 7 These figures only
encompass undergraduate borrowing; graduate and professional
students also borrow significantly.
Student loans are the source of more unsecured debt than credit
cards.8 American students owed about $1.2 trillion in outstanding

5.

ANNE JOHNSON ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & CAMPUS PROGRESS, THE STUDENT DEBT

CRISIS 6 (2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/
10/WhiteStudentDebt-5.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZB54-W7K8. The report also notes that
the Consumer Price Index increased about one hundred percent over the same period, with
gasoline prices rising two hundred percent and healthcare costs rising two hundred fifty percent.
Id. While this Note does not address the contribution that lowering the cost of higher education
would make to affordability and loan volume, others are pursuing that solution. In August 2013,
President Obama released a proposal that includes a number of measures designed to make college
more affordable. For example, the proposal incentivizes institutions to lower costs by tying federal
aid to a new ratings system, which would incorporate information about each institution's ease of
access, affordability, and outcomes. Release, The White House, Fact Sheet on the President's Plan
to Make College More Affordable: A Better Bargain for the Middle Class (Aug. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/22/fact-sheet-president-s-planmake-college-more-affordable-better-bargain-, archived at http://perma.cc/ EP8U-2L52. A draft of
the ratings system is currently available for public comment. Press Release, Dep't of Educ., For
Public Feedback: A College Ratings Framework (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/public-feedback-college-ratings-framework, archived at http://perma.cc/EMT6-KJCD.
Additionally, in October 2014, the Department of Education issued new regulations directed at
for-profit colleges that, among other things, provide a mechanism to revoke federal student aid if
students carry high debt loads compared to their incomes after graduation. 34 C.F.R. § 668 (2014).
The full text of the final rule is available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/10/31/
2014-25594/program-integrity-gainful-employment#h-7. See also Press Release, Dep't of Educ.,
Obama Administration Announces Final Rules to protect Students from Poor-Performing Career
College Programs (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/obama-administrationannounces-final-rules-protect-students-poor-performing-care, archived at http://perma.cc/TX4FXKCB.
Allie Bidwell, Average Student Loan Debt Jumps 10 Percent, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 4, 2013,
6.
2:16 PM), http://www.usnews.cominews/articles/2013/12/04/average-student-loan-debt-jumps-10percent, archived at http://perma.cc/K9LW-3RJD. The Institute for College Access and Success
notes that its figures are reported by colleges and universities and may not include all private
loans if students neglected to report them. Further, debt averages do not include figures from
graduates of for-profit universities, because such colleges are not required by law to report their
students' debt. However, there are some indications that a higher percentage of students at forprofit institutions take out loans and that they borrow in larger amounts. Id.
7.

INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, STUDENT DEBT AND THE CLASS OF 2012 1 (2013),

available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/classof2Ol2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
MP3Q-YZ3F.
8.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN

(2012) 4, available at

http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201210.cfpbStudent-Loan-Ombudsman-Annual-Report.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/DK64-F29L.
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student loans as of May 2013, a total increase of twenty percent since
2011.9 Forty percent of households headed by an individual under the
age of thirty-five carry student loan debt.' 0 This increase in borrowing
has had broad effects on consumerism: the number of twenty-five- to
thirty-four-year-olds
purchasing homes has decreased,
with
substantially more people in this age bracket moving in with their
parents."
This Note considers regulatory methods for curbing the high and
variable interest rates offered by private student lenders. Part II
examines the mechanics of private student loans, describes existing
regulations that govern private student lenders, and identifies recent
disputes about government-lender relationships. Part III considers a
number of methods for addressing high-cost student lending and draws
upon the authority of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and
its regulations governing other types of lending. Part IV proposes, in
the short term, instituting enhanced disclosure for high-cost loans and
incentivizing lender-school partnerships to help students find low-cost
options before they commit to borrowing. In the long term, Part IV
argues that lenders should be required to consider a student's projected
ability to repay an educational loan before lending. Using ability-torepay as a prerequisite could decrease overborrowing and default rates
and allow students to enter the job market with debt loads that they
realistically can repay. As described in Part III, this framework, along
with a qualified-loan safe harbor for consumer-friendly mortgages, was
implemented for mortgage lenders following the recent financial crisis.
Part IV thus proposes that regulators formulate and test an ability-torepay calculation and a qualified-loan structure that would provide
students similar protections as mortgagors currently receive.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF STUDENT BORROWING
A. How Lenders Reach Students
The process of financing education often begins with an
application for federal aid; specifically, students and families fill out the
Free Application for Federal Student Aid ("FAFSA"). The Department
of Education then determines the "Expected Family Contribution"
9.
Rohit Chopra, Student Loan Ombudsman, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Remarks at
Center for American Progress Conference: Student Debt Swells, Federal Loans Now Top a Trillion
(July 17, 2013), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/student-debt-swellsfederal-loans-now-top-a-trillion/, archived at http://perma.ccfL24N-QAT5.
10. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 18.
11.
Id. (discussing data from 2011).
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("EFC")12 that each student will be directly responsible for financing.
Each institution calculates a cost-of-attendance figure, which includes
tuition and fees plus an estimated cost of other necessary expenses.' 3
The school's cost of attendance less the EFC (and other aid, such as
merit-based scholarships) yields the amount of federal aid available.' 4
This aid comes in many forms, including grants, work-study, and
subsidized federal loans.
Thus, students (and sometimes their families) are responsible
for contributing the EFC to their educations. There are a number of
options available to fund the EFC besides paying out of pocket. The
federal government offers two unsubsidized loan options: PLUS loans
and unsubsidized Stafford loans. In addition, there are financing
options that operate entirely in the private market.
PLUS loans are available to parents of undergraduate students
and to students seeking graduate or professional degrees.' 5 PLUS loans
have a predetermined (i.e., not calculated on a borrower-by-borrower
basis), fixed interest rate and borrowers can obtain an amount up to the
school's cost of attendance, less other financial aid; however, PLUS
loans are not available to borrowers with adverse credit histories.1 6 The
government also offers Stafford loans, which are not credit-dependent
but have fixed annual caps and lifetime limits.' 7
Before 2010, many students secured federal loans under the
Federal Family Education Loan Program ("FFEL Program"). Under the
FFEL Program, private lenders actually funded the loans, and

12. EFC is comprised of a percentage of income and assets. For dependent students, parent
income and assets are included, as well as the number of other dependents and the number of
dependents simultaneously attending a postsecondary institution. Federal Pell Grant Program,
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fpg/index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
A2VE-2UFJ (last modified Apr. 9, 2014).
13. How Colleges Figure "Cost of Attendance," COLLEGEDATA, http://www.collegedata.com/
cs/content/content-payarticle-.tmpl.jhtml?articleld=10065, archived at http://perma.cc/3WTM.
NYEW (last visited July 4, 2014).

14. Id.
15. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN PROGRAMS 2 (2013), available at
http://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/federal-loan-programs.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
3QTD-TEZR. There are a number of specific credit conditions considered adverse, including having
accounts more than ninety days past due and foreclosure or repossession within the past five years.
Glossary, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/glossary, archived at http://
perma.cc/8RJ9-58QK (last visited Aug. 19, 2014). Borrowers with adverse credit histories can be
eligible for PLUS loans with an endorser. PLUS Loans, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/plus#can-i-still, archived at http://perma.cc/48QU-5TMT
(last visited Aug. 19, 2014).

16.

PLUS Loans, supra note 15.

17.
Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/
types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized, archivedat http://perma.cc4LVV-FTF2 (last visited Sept. 7,
2014).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

230

[Vol. 68:1:225

educational institutions and the federal government guaranteed
them.' 8 In addition to the guarantee, the federal government paid a
subsidy to private lenders for each qualifying loan originated.
Qualifying loans had to have interest rates below a congressionally
mandated maximum. 19
Students receive access to federal loans as a part of the financial
aid package presented by their schools; so, under the FFEL Program,
private lenders had direct relationships with colleges and universities. 20
These lenders lobbied schools both to use them as federal loan providers
and to refer students to them for private loans if federal unsubsidized
loans did not cover the EFC. 21 Because schools and private lenders
communicated about federal loans, when a student applied for a private
loan, the school would verify that a borrower was, in fact, enrolled and
that total aid and borrowing did not exceed the institution's stated cost
of attendance.2 2 Lenders would supply the private loan funds directly to
schools, which would apply all required monies to tuition and fees
before disbursing the balance to students to spend on living expenses. 23
A 2009 report by the Congressional Budget Office determined
that, by directly lending to students rather than paying banks'
origination fees, the federal government could save significant sums. 2 4
The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 eliminated
the FFEL Program. 25 Today, all federal loans are made under the Direct

18.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS: REPORT TO THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH,
EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL
SERVICES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE

11 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 201207_cfpb Reports_ Private-StudentLoans.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/M934-HHP2.
19. Direct Loans vs. the FFEL Program, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/dl-vsffel.phtml, archived at http://perma.cc/PFF4-PM9H (last visited Jan. 11, 2014); FFEL Program
Lender and Guaranty Agency Reports, OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/
about/data-center/lender-guaranty, archived at http://perma.cc/S3VX-HCR7 (last visited Jan. 11,
2014).
20. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 11.
21. Id.
22. See id. (noting that schools ensured that lending did not exceed the EFC).
23. Id.
24.

CONG.

BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE,

H.R. 3221:

STUDENT

AID AND

FISCAL

RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 2009 1, (2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/104xx/docl0479/hr3221.pdf, archived at http://perma.cclVC7-FN7F (estimating that a
direct-lending alternative to the FFEL Program would save the federal government $13.3 billion
between 2009 and 2013).
25. FFEL ProgramLender and GuarantyAgency Reports, supra note 19.
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Loan Program, which lends government funds instead of federally
guaranteed private funds.2 6
As described above, under the FFEL Program, educational
institutions themselves delivered private student loan funds after
verifying students were not borrowing more than the cost of
attendance. 27 This cooperation and verification system broke down
during a lending boom between 2005 and 2007.28 Private lenders began
marketing their products "direct to customer" and disbursing some
funds directly to students instead of using educational institutions as
intermediaries. 29
B. Featuresof Private Student Loans
While most educational loans are borrowed from the federal
government, students and graduates owe over $150 billion to private
lenders. 30 In some ways, private loans appear similar to federal
unsubsidized loans. Neither requires students to make payments until
six months after graduation, but both accrue interest that is
capitalized.3'
However,
while unsubsidized
federal loans have
a
predetermined interest rate, 32 many private student lenders determine
rates based on an individual student's creditworthiness. 33 While lenders
advertise a range of interest rates, a student only learns of the risk-

26. Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/ffellindex.html
(last modified Apr. 9, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/76AM-QC5L.
27. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 11. In its report, the CFPB referred to
school financial aid offices during this time as "gatekeepers." Id.
28. Id. at 19; see infra Section II.B.
29. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 19.
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 11-12.
32. Rates currently range from 3.86 percent to 6.41 percent, depending on the loan type.
Interest Rates and Fees, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/interestrates#what-are-the-interest, archived at http://perma.cc/5ZTW-JMMY (last visited Nov. 12, 2014).
These are the rates for loans originated for the 2013-2014 academic year. Id. Loans originated in
prior years are subject to different rates. Id. For some perspective, note that in the fall of 2013, the
average new car loan interest rate was 3.94 percent and the average thirty-year mortgage carried
an interest rate of 4.1 percent. Marcy Gordon, Average Rate on Mortgage at 4.1 Percent, USA
TODAY
(Oct.
31,
2013,
1:50
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
personalfinance/2013/10/31/ mortgage-rates/3325943/, archived at http://perma.cc/5LH2-RW-UN;
Chris Woodyard, More New-Car Buyers Opt for 7-Year Loans, USA TODAY (Oct. 28,2013, 6:12 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2013/10/28/long-term-car-loans/3191819/, archived at
http://perma.cc/EX98-BX3K.
33. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 12. The proportion of cosigned private
loans has increased substantially since the financial crisis in 2008. Id. at 26.
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based rate the lender is actually offering once a loan is approved. 34
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau data documenting private loans
originating between 2005 and 2011 show that, while the most
creditworthy borrowers sometimes received an initial rate below the
Stafford rate, the average initial rate never dipped below 6.8 percent
(the federal unsubsidized loan interest rate at the time). The maximum
rate topped sixteen percent for loans originating in the fourth quarter
of 2008.35
As this may suggest, private loan interest rates can be variable,
fluctuating with the market. 36 This makes interest rates unpredictable
across both the borrowing and repayment periods. Additionally,
variable-rate caps can reach nineteen percent for the least creditworthy
borrowers, almost three times the rate offered for unsubsidized federal
loans. 37
The total amount of private lending available is dependent on
the market. Student loans are collateralized and sold as asset-backed
securities. 38 Trends in private student lending can be compared to the
boom in the subprime mortgage market that occurred between 2005
and 2007.39 During this same period, there was high demand for
student-loan securities. 40 Because investors assumed the risk of default,
lenders were incentivized to originate more loans. 41 CFPB research
indicates that, between 2005 and 2007, private lenders decreased credit
standards, offering more loans to less creditworthy borrowers. 42 During
the recession, the amount of loans in default increased dramatically.43
Since that time, market demand for these securities has decreased, and
lenders have correspondingly increased their underwriting standards
and begun requiring cosigners in order to improve the likelihood of
repayment. 44 Although "subprime student lending," as well as the total
amount of private student lending, appears to have decreased in the

34. Id. at 13.
35.
Id. at 14.
36.
See id. at 13 (describing how changes in the market create risks for private student loan
borrowers).
37.
Id. at 12.
38.
Id. at 18.
39.
Id; see also infra Parts 1ID, IVA, and IV.B.2 for further comparison of the private
student loan and mortgage industries, as well as the regulatory frameworks that govern them.
40. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supranote 18, at 18.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 22-23.
43. Id. at 24-25.
44. Id. at 26-27.
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current financial market,4 5 the 2005 to 2007 boom indicates that future
securities demand could loosen lending standards. 46 In fact, Sallie Mae,
one of the largest private student lenders, has a goal to increase its
private loan origination by a rate of twenty percent per year. 47
Finally, private lenders do not offer the borrower protections
that the federal government provides. 48 Federal loans offer a number of
repayment plans that calculate monthly payments based on the
borrower's income after graduation. 49 Many of these plans forgive any
remaining balance if a borrower pays according to the plan for a
specified number of years.5 0 Further, once federal loans are in default,
borrowers have the opportunity to cure the default, which will change
how it is reflected on the borrower's credit report.5 1 Borrowers of private
student loans do not enjoy these protections. 52 In fact, many private
lenders requiring a cosigner will demand immediate and full repayment
of the loan amount if a cosigner dies or goes bankrupt while the student
45. According to MeasureOne, an organization that compiled a report on private student
loans, for the 2008-2009 academic year, 7.85 percent of private student loans were not school
certified. For 2013-2014 loans, that number decreased to 0.93 percent (up from 0.79 percent the
year before). MeasureOne's data comes from disclosures by the six largest private student lenders,
which make up about sixty-nine percent of the market. DAN FESHBACH ET AL., MEASUREONE, THE
MEASUREONE PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN PERFORMANCE REPORT-JULY 2014 1-2, 15 (2014).

46.
In October 2014, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, a number of agencies collaborated and
issued a final rule that requires entities securitizing assets to retain five percent of the credit risk.
Some loans that meet certain underwriting standards, such as Qualified Mortgages (discussed
infra Part III.D.2), are exempted from the credit risk retention requirement. Credit Risk Retention
(final rule Oct. 22, 2014), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2014/nria-2014-140a.pdf. These regulations may diminish the incentive to reestablish subprime student
lending as it occurred in the 2005 boom.
47.
Wade Malcolm, Details Emerge on Sallie Mae Split, DEL. ONLINE. (Dec. 13, 2013, 8:47
PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/2013/12/13/details-emerge-on-sallie-mae-split/4017579/, archived at http://perma.cc/6C7D-PBDU.
48. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 12-13. Recently, however, Wells Fargo
and Discover (both private student lenders) announced new programs that would allow
modifications to student loan repayment programs. Wells Fargo's program is currently active and
is directed towards students experiencing financial hardship. Robert Farrington, Private Student
Loan
Lenders
Start
Offering Loan
Modifications,
FORBES
(Nov.
26,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2014/11/26/private-student-loan-lenders-startoffering-loan-modifications/; News Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Launches Private Student
Loan Modification Program, (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/press/2014/
student-loan-modification_1119.content, archived at http://perma.cc/23WW-3KRK.
49. Overview of Direct Loan and FFEL Program Repayment Plans, FED. STUDENT AID,
http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans archived at http://perma.cclUBY8-PT8N
(last visited Sept. 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.ce/UBY8-PT8N. The options vary based on
the type of loan and the calculation used to determine the payment amount. Id.
50. Id. (twenty to twenty-five years).
51. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 12-13.
52. Id. (noting that, since many private loans require a cosigner, it is less likely that
borrowers will be unable to repay their debt compared to borrowers of Stafford loans, which are
not granted based upon creditworthiness).
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has outstanding debt. 5 3 As neither public nor private student loans are
generally dischargeable in bankruptcy,54 a lack of repayment options
can make it more difficult for students to manage private loan debt. In
2012, over 850,000 private student loans, with a total debt in excess of

$8 billion, were in default.55
C. Common Dangersof Private Student Loans
In addition to unfavorable terms, private loans present other
issues. First, after the FFEL Program was eliminated, lender-school
collaborations suffered, and lenders did not always pursue information
about a student's EFC or other sources of aid.5 6 Instead of basing loan
offers on the student-specific EFC-aid disparity, lenders created general
caps based on fixed amounts or the school's reported cost-of-attendance
figure.57 In short, this allowed students to borrow more funds than their

53.
CFPB Finds PrivateStudent Loan Borrowers Face "Auto-Default"When Co-Signer Dies
or
Goes
Bankrupt,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU
(Apr.
22,
2014),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-finds-private-student-loan-borrowers-face-autodefault-when-co-signer-dies-or-goes-bankrupt/, archived at http://perma.cc/PY85-K4PG.
54.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012) (stating that education loans are not dischargeable in
bankruptcy unless this would impose "undue hardship" on the debtor and the debtor's dependents);
see also Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987)
(providing a three-part test for "undue hardship," including that the borrower, having made a
good-faith effort at repayment, would not be able to maintain "minimal" standards of living for a
"significant portion of the repayment period" if forced to pay). This reform was passed in 2005.
Today, there is substantial support for revisiting or reversing this prohibition, which could
pressure lenders to improve underwriting standards or to provide modification options for
borrowers facing default. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN
(2014) 27-30, available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201410-cfpb-report-annual-reportof-the-student-loan-ombudsman.pdf, archivedathttp://perma.cc/YT9D-KBKX (suggesting that the
current discharge rules allow high post-default recovery for student loans, incentivizing lenders
not to help borrowers avoid default); MARK KANTROWITZ, WHO GRADUATES COLLEGE WITH SIXFIGURE
STUDENT
LOAN
DEBT?
3
(2012),
available at
http://www.finaid.org/
educators/20120801sixfiguredebt.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SY63-8VLH (positing that
allowing discharge of student loans would encourage lenders to strengthen underwriting
standards); Tyler Kingkade, Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Rule Traps Graduates with Debt
amid Calls for Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr.
15, 2012, 9:51 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/14/private-student-loans-bankruptcy-law-n_1753462.html
(quoting Sallie Mae representatives who claim to support bankruptcy reform, at least for some
students). Bankruptcy reform also faces strong opposition from some banks and politicians. See id.
(discussing opposition to bankruptcy reform and quoting Senator Dick Durbin, who believes that
the legislation he has introduced numerous times to reverse the bankruptcy prohibition for student
loans is "going nowhere"). This Note acknowledges the potential propriety of bankruptcy reform
but examines other possible approaches to modifying predatory private student lending practices.
55. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
56. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 19.
57. Id.
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schools deemed necessary.5 8 During the recession, many private lenders
reinitiated school verification before originating new loans and
decreased their total lending, diminishing this effect in recent years.5 9
However, as noted in Section II.B, market demand for asset-backed
securities could incentivize lenders to loosen underwriting standards in
the future and originate more loans.60 CFPB data on loans marketed
direct to customer between 2005 and 2007 indicates that students have
the propensity to borrow more than their schools' calculated cost of
attendance when excess funds are available. 61
Second, student borrowers are not satisfied with their private
loans. While students frequently complain that they are unable to
negotiate repayment plans, borrowers also experience confusion and
difficulty getting information from their creditors. 62 Loans are often
sold from one company to another, and terms change in the process. 63
When a borrower has a checking account with the same parent
institution as his loan servicer, lenders have directly deducted late
payments from the borrower's checking account. 64 Borrowers may be
told that they should enroll in repayment or incentive programs but
experience difficulties when they actually try to do so. 6 5 Thus, borrowers
are often unhappy with the inflexible terms of their loans but have little
recourse when they contact the lenders.
In sum, the private student loan industry yields a number of
concerns for consumers eager to invest in their educations. First, except
for the most creditworthy borrowers, interest rates are higher than
federal loans and are often variable, leading to unpredictability when it
comes time to repay. Second, when market demand for asset-backed
securities is high, private lenders are willing to make subprime student
loans for amounts much higher than students need to cover their
educations and costs of living. Third, the private industry does not offer
the repayment and forgiveness options that are available on the federal
level, making it difficult for debtors to meet their obligations. Further,
borrowers often face challenges finding answers to their concerns when

58. See id. (stating that lenders "circumvented the school's financial aid office" and allowed
students to "borrow more than the EFC").
59. Id. at 18-21.
60. See id. at 89 ("[Tjhere is no guarantee that the direct-to-customer (DTC) loan market of
the near past will not reemerge as the economy improves.").
61. Id. at 20-21.
62. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 6-12.
63. Id. at 8 (noting one student's complaint that payment-processing times and
corresponding late fees changed when her loan was sold to a new servicer).
64. Id. at 7.
65. Id. at 8-9.
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they try to contact their lenders or servicers. These borrower-unfriendly
lending practices have yielded a significant amount of defaults, which
affect graduates' ability to support themselves and their families.
D. Existing Regulatory Framework
Disclosure-based regulations and lender supervision currently
govern the private student lending market. For example, the Higher
Education Opportunity Act66 extended Truth in Lending Act 6 7
requirements to the private student loan industry. Intending to
promote a class of knowledgeable borrowers, these regulations
primarily require disclosing terms and conditions to consumers seeking
credit.6 8 Disclosures specifically applicable to private student loans
include interest rates, fees, repayment terms, cost estimates, consumer
rights, and information about federal student loan alternatives.6 9
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
("CFPB") and gave the agency explicit authority over private student
loan providers. 70 The CFPB has authority to promulgate rules under
the guidelines of some existing consumer protection statutes, such as
the Truth in Lending Act.71 The CFPB was also charged with appointing
a Student Loan Ombudsman, who, in conjunction with the Department
of Education, is required to compile a report on federal student loans.72
The current Ombudsman, Rohit Chopra, has not only compiled much
information about recent trends in private student loans, 73 but has also
provided a platform for borrowers to submit publicly available
complaints that shed light on consumer frustrations with the private

66. Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C, 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1667f.
68.
See DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42572, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU (CFPB): A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1-4, 11-12 (2014) (discussing the CFPB's

purpose and relevant regulations).
69.
12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.46-47 (2014). The private loan regulations also disallow some
cobranding using the school's name or symbols and require that, when schools are permitted to
endorse particular lenders, it be clearly disclosed that the school itself is not providing the funds.
Id. § 1026.48.
70. Dodd-Frank Wall StreetReform and Consumer ProtectionAct, Pub. L. No. 111-203,124
Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C.,
18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); CARPENTER, supra note 68, at 16.
71. CARPENTER, supra note 68, at 23-25.
72.
12 U.S.C. § 5535; CARPENTER, supra note 68, at 12.
73. A summary of which is provided supra Sections L.A and I.B.
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student lending market.74 On December 6, 2013, the CFPB issued a
final rule that will allow the agency to supervise large market
participants in the student loan servicing industry. 75
Thus, while current regulations attempt to provide students
with better information before they agree to loans and with supervision
over servicing practices once they have loans, these regulations do not
address student loan affordability. While the cost of going to college
continues to increase and students look for ways to finance their
educations, private student lenders continue to market high or variable
interest rates that can be difficult to repay after graduation.
E. Sallie Mae and PrivateLoan Funding
Sallie Mae is one of the largest private student lenders in the
United States, both originating and holding the largest amount of
student loan debt as of 2010.76 Additionally, in 2009, Sallie Mae won a
contract to become a federal loan collector and servicer. 7 Sallie Mae
also benefitted from the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans
Act ("ESCALSA"), which allowed private lenders to continue profiting
from the FFEL Program in 2008 and 2009 after they claimed that, given
the financial climate at that time, they could not afford to make loans

74. Rohit Chopra, Thousands of Voices on Private Student Loans, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU BLOG (June 13, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.govblog/thousands-of-voices-onprivate-student-loans/, archived at http://perma.cclU7AT-TX6V; ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 8, at
2; see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 70 (discussing public comments from
consumers). Full text of the comments submitted is available at Request for InformationRegarding
Private

Education

Loans

and

Private

Educational

Lenders,

REGULATIONS.GOV,

(last
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;dct=PS;D=CFPB-2011-0037,
visited Dec. 20, 2014).
75. 12 C.F.R. § 1090.106 (2014), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/ articles/2013/
12/06/2013-29 145/defining-larger-participants-of-the-student-loan-servicing-market#h-9,
archived at http://perma.cc/6P7D-3FE7.
76. Largest Education Lenders, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/biglenders.phtml,
archived at http://perma.ccV587-8LHM (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) (data listed is accurate as of
March 2010). According to Sallie Mae, since the recession, twenty private student lenders originate
student loans. Letter from John F. Remondi, President & Chief Operating Officer, Sallie Mae, to
Monica Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec'y, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Jan. 17, 2012), available
at
http://salliemae.newshq.businesswire.com/sites/salliemae.newshq.businesswire.com/files/
doc_1ibrary/file/SallieMaeResponsetoConsumerFinancialProtectionBure.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/S3BD-9W8J.
77.
Title IV Student Loan Management/Servicing, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=d767e036118e6fc63ecdf7d6
la5471a4&_cview=0, archived at http://perma.cclVFF4-P2BQ (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). A
redacted copy of the government's contract with Sallie Mae is available at https://www.fbo.gov/
index?id=c845bdd7d98de24fel63b8a55e5f76a8, archived at http://perma.cc/KL4C-NYZK. The
structure of Sallie Mae's business has recently changed. The present structure and its implications
are discussed infra Section III.B.
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according to the program's required terms.7 8 ESCALSA allowed private
lenders to sell loans to the Department of Education and borrow from
an asset-backed commercial paper conduit at low rates such that
lenders would retain sufficient liquidity to originate more loans.7 9 Sallie
Mae generated hundreds of millions of dollars in profits in 2009 and
2010 based on their access to the loan purchase program implemented
under ESCALSA. 8 0
In June 2013, Senator Elizabeth Warren brought to light a
troubling source of Sallie Mae's loan funding.8 1 According to Sallie
Mae's annual Securities Exchange Commission filing in 2012, the
company borrowed $8.5 billion from the Federal Home Loan Bank in
Des Moines to originate new private student loans. 82 Congress created
Federal Home Loan Banks to provide funds to local lenders who were
supposed to stimulate regional development by providing loans to
"families, farms and businesses." 83 Tax exemptions allow the Federal
78.

DEP'T OF EDUC., ENSURING CONTINUED ACCESS TO STUDENT LOANS ACT (ESCALSA)

ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
2-4 (2011), available at http://studentaid.ed.gov/
sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/July2011ECASLAReport.pdf,
archived at http://
perma.cc/58VX-5A2J. Congress quickly passed ESCALSA in May 2008 in response to threats that
lenders would not make loans under the FFEL Program for the 2008-2009 school year. Under the
FFEL Program, the Higher Education Act set loan terms and interest rates; in the 2008 financial
climate, the FFEL Program lenders argued that they could not afford to lend on those terms. The
government's primary concern was ensuring students would get the necessary disbursements to
meet their education costs. Thus, ESCALSA required lenders to use loan proceeds to originate
more loans; however, it also allowed private lenders to stay in the federally guaranteed market in
2008 and 2009. Id. According to a letter from Senator Elizabeth Warren to Sallie Mae, the
company's 10-Ks report that it made $284 million in 2009 and $321 million in 2010 using
ESCALSA programs. Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Senator, Mass., to Jacob Lew, Sec'y, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, and Arne Duncan, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Sept. 19, 2013), available at
http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/Letter%2Ofrom%20Elizabeth%2OWarren%2Oto%2
OED,%2OTreasury%20-%209-19-2019.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C3YA-NXFB.
79.

DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 78, at 2-7.

80.
Letter from Elizabeth Warren, supra note 78; see also Shahien Nasiripour & Joy
Resmovits, Sallie Mae Lags in Student Debt Relief amid Ongoing FederalProbes, HUFFINGTON
POST (September 3, 2013, 3:50 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/03/sallie-mae-studentdebt_n_3839243.html, archived at http://perma.cclMJ8P-TRSU (reporting, in September 2013,
that Sallie Mae had earned over $300 million dollars as a federal loan servicer); Title IV Student
Loan Marketing/Servicing, supranote 77 (setting forth specifics of loan award program).
81. Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Senator, Mass., to Edward DeMarco, Acting Dir., Fed.
Hous. Fin. Agency (June 24, 2013), available at http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/
20130624FHFALetter.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/98WD-H62V.
82. Id.; Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Senator, Mass., to John F. Remondi, President and
Chief Exec. Officer, SLM Corp. (June 25, 2013), available at http:// www.warren.senate.gov/files/
documents/SallieMaeLtr.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/78KB-URU9.
83. Overview, FED. HOME LOAN BANKS, http://www.fhlbanks.com/overviewwhyfhlb.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/5SHV-SE5X (last visited Jan. 9, 2014). In a response to Senator
Warren's letter, Sallie Mae President and CEO John Remondi claimed that the funds were only
used for federally guaranteed loans as a part of the now-discontinued Family Education Loan
Program, an action authorized by Congress. Letter from John F. Remondi, President and Chief
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Home Loan Banks to access inexpensive capital and lend at low interest
rates. 84 Sallie Mae was therefore able to borrow on its $8.5 billion line
of credit with a 0.23 percent interest rate. Sallie Mae earned $2.5 billion
in interest income in 2012 by lending that money to students at rates
twenty-five to forty times higher than the rate at which the company
borrowed.8 5 Thus, while Sallie Mae enjoys extremely low interest rates
that were not intended to be accessed by private corporate lenders, they
do not pass those rates on to their borrowers.8 6
Due to the large financial incentive to maintain and renew its
government contract,87 an obvious strategy to regulate private student
lending would be to take advantage of Sallie Mae's dependence on
federal contracts. When offering lucrative servicing contracts to
corporations that also offer private loans directly to students, the
Department of Education could include contract terms that require
lenders to offer fixed-rate loans with some interest rate cap or
calculation. This measure would directly address the affordability
problem by placing a limit on interest rates, which current CFPB
regulation cannot achieve on its own. It would likely also allow the
federal government greater access to information about private lending
products that could help the CFPB monitor student lending and
formulate future regulations to address concerns.
Seemingly considering this strategy, in 2013 the CFPB Student
Loan Ombudsman warned investors in financial services providers that
"repeated violations of the law can have serious repercussions for the
financial institutions they invest in, especially for those institutions
Exec. Officer, Sallie Mae, to Elizabeth Warren, Senator, Mass. (June 25, 2013), available at
http://salliemae.newshq.businesswire.comisites/salliemae.newshq.businesswire.com/files/
doc_1 ibrary/filefLettertoTheHonorableElizabethWarrenDatedJune25_2013_fromJohn_
FRemondiFINAL_2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cclGB9V-Z743.
84. 12 U.S.C. § 1433 (2012); Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Senator, Mass., to Edward
DeMarco, Acting Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, supranote 81.
85. Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Senator, Mass., to Edward DeMarco, Acting Dir., Fed.
Hous. Fin. Agency, supra note 81.
86. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 13. Sallie Mae did not disclose the
FHFA credit line in its October 2013 quarterly report; however, the Huffington Post reported that
as of September 30, 2013, Sallie Mae was still accessing the credit line. Shahien Nasiripour, Sallie
Mae Reduces Disclosure of ControversialFunding Source, HUFFINGTON POsT (Nov. 5, 2013, 11:23
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/05/sallie-mae-elizabeth-warren-n_4218834.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/QV3T-VCKL.
87. According to a fall 2013 Huffington Post article, Sallie Mae had plans to "increase its
revenue from federal contracts." Shahien Nasiripour, Sallie Mae Faces Additional Government
Probes as Scrutiny Increases, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2013,
11:43
PM),
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/28/sallie-mae-investigations-n 4172169.html,
archived at
http://perma.cc/4AM5-4TKT. This indicates that loan servicing was a profitable division of Sallie
Mae's business and that the threat of losing its contract work could provide a compelling reason
to amend its lending policies.
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who depend on federal and state licensures and contracts."*8 Senator
Elizabeth Warren, in her letter to the Departments of Education and
the Treasury, also suggested that Sallie Mae should not receive the
benefit of federal programs and contracts based on its predatory lending
and numerous servicing infractions.89
Appearing to believe that the threats were real, Sallie Mae
recently spun off its loan servicing business into a separate entity,
Navient. 90 Navient services loans under federal contracts while Sallie
Mae continues as a private student lender.91 The company admitted
that it was motivated to make the split to "simplify [Sallie Mae's]
regulatory requirements" by extracting the private loan business from
the reach of the Department of Education and the FDIC. 92 The federal
government renewed Navient's servicing contract (inherited from Sallie
Mae in the spinoff) in June 2014.93
Thus, while conditioning government contracts on favorable
private loan terms may create large monetary incentives for companies
who directly offer student loans or do so through subsidiaries, many
lenders would likely follow Sallie Mae's lead and separate their private
student loan businesses into entirely separate entities. This regulatory
arbitrage would make contract incentives more effective to address
borrower concerns directly related to federal loans, such as servicing
failures and misrepresentations. Therefore, it is critical that other
agencies, such as the CFPB, find alternate methods to push private
student lending towards more affordable interest rates.
III. POTENTIAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYZING AND REGULATING
PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS

Today's students take on increasing amounts of debt to finance
their educations in hopes that they will earn good jobs and achieve goals
88. Nasiripour & Resmovits, supra note 80.
89. Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Senator, Mass., to Jacob Lew, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, and Arne Duncan, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 78.
90.
See, e.g., Sallie Mae is Changing,SALLIE MAE, https://www.salliemae.com/about/who-weare/future/, archived at http://perma.cc/YX2A-3RS7 (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) (stating that
Navient will be the servicer of student loans); Sallie Mae Board Approves Strategic Separationof
Navient Corporation, Sets Record Date and DistributionDate, SALLIE MAE, (Apr. 10, 2014, 9:00
AM), http://news.salliemae.com/press-release/corporate-and-financial/sallie-mae-board-approvesstrategic-separation-navient-corpora, archived at http://perma.cc/7RKG-RWPE (announcing the
split of Sallie Mae's loan management and servicing company, Navient, from its consumer banking
business).
91. Sallie Mae Board Approves Strategic Separationof Navient Corporation,supranote 90.
92. Malcolm, supranote 47.
93. Alan Zibel, U.S. Extends Navient Corp Student Loan Contract, WALL ST. J., June 17,
2014, http://online.wsj.com/ articles/u-s-extends-navient-corp-student-loan-contract- 1403043388.
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like providing for their families and owning their own homes. 94
However, student debt ultimately prevents many college graduates
from realizing these goals. 95 Students who borrow money should be
accountable for the funds that they owe. Nonetheless, protecting
students from the high interest rates offered by private student lenders
can help to make higher education more affordable and allow graduates
to enter the workforce without crippling payments that limit their
abilities to fulfill the dreams they have worked for. Further, if students
take out affordable loans that they can repay in a timely manner,
lenders could save on collection costs. 9 6 There are a number of legal
frameworks that can inform realistic and effective methods to limit the
high interest rates that private student lenders charge.9 7
A. Payday Lending Regulation as a Model for Private Student
Lending Regulations
Payday lending has been the subject of much comment in the
past several years for some of the same reasons that private student
lending is gaining attention. Payday lending is often seen as predatory;
lenders make enormous profits by charging exorbitant interest rates to
people who are borrowing in the short term to make it to their next
paycheck.9 8 Many see these lenders as taking advantage of borrowers'
short-term needs. 99 As during the student lending boom, where
underwriting standards diminished to increase loan volumes,100 payday
lenders often ignore a payday borrower's projected ability to repay a

94. See supra Part I.A.
95. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 18.
96. While it is possible that savings on collection costs would offset increased earnings that
higher interest rates yield, this Note does not assert that that is the case. However, improved
ability to collect would presumably be a benefit to lenders.
97. Some have contemplated a private right of action based on the price unconscionability
doctrine as a method for consumers to challenge high interest rates and predatory lending. See
generally Hirsh Ament, Predatory Lending: What Will Stop It?, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 371 (2009)
(arguing that the unconscionability doctrine can be used to prevent foreclosures stemming from
predatory mortgage lending); Frank P. Darr, Unconscionabilityand Price Fairness, 30 HOUS. L.
REV. 1819 (1994) (analyzing price unconscionability cases through a price fairness model).
Although individual litigation might prove too costly in the context of student loans, price
unconscionability class action suits might be an effective consumer-driven effort to limit high,
variable interest rate student loans. However, this Note will focus on government-created
statutory and regulatory responses to private student lending affordability and will not discuss
consumer-initiated solutions.
98. Nathalie Martin, 1000% Interest-Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan
Practicesand Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 570 (2010).
99. Id.
100. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 22-23.
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loan. 101 Private student lenders might be cast in the same light.
Students know that without a college degree their careers and lifetime
earning prospects will suffer. They have opportunities to go to school
but cannot afford to do so without borrowing. Private lenders take
advantage of that necessity by lending at high and variable interest
rates. Thus, state and federal legal responses to payday lending might
provide an informative framework for addressing private student
lending.
One prominent legislative response to predatory lending in the
payday loan industry10 2 is to create a criminal usury cap. A criminal
usury cap establishes a statutory maximum for interest rates.1 03 A
number of states have implemented criminal usury caps specific to
short-term lending. For example, Alabama caps payday loan interest
rates at 17.5 percent, 104 while New Hampshire's cap is higher, at 36
percent. 0 5 To further ensure the efficacy of the cap, New Hampshire
law also mandates that all charges and fees be included. 106 Thus,
lenders cannot circumvent the law by lowering interest rates but
reconfiguring origination and other fees to maintain the same profit off
of any loan that would have been made before the measure was passed
in 2010. Universal inclusion of charges and fees in the cap is a critical
component of effecting the cap's purpose and helping borrowers
understand the full cost of their debts.1 07 The CFPB already engages in
some fee inclusion regulation, albeit not related to interest rate caps.
Through its authority to implement the Truth in Lending Act, the
CFPB dictates annual percentage rate ("APR") calculation formulas.
These formulas let lenders know what types of fees and charges must
be included in APR figures that they must disclose to consumers. 08
101. See Leah A. Plunkett & Ana Lucia Hurtado, Small-Dollar Loans, Big Problems: How
States Protect Consumers from Abuses and How the Federal Government Can Help, 44 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 31, 55 (2011).
102. Because of differences between private student lending and payday loan structures, this
is also the method most readily applicable to the private student lending market. Other common
methods include statutory maximums on the amount that can be borrowed in a payday loan as
well as a statutory maximum term. Some states have prohibited payday lending outright. For a
summary and side-by-side comparison of state payday lending statutes, see Payday Lending
Statutes, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ financial-

services-and-commerce/payday-lending-state-statutes.aspx,
archived at http://perma.cc/47B374WF (last updated Sept. 12, 2013).
103. See Plunkett & Hurtado, supra note 101, at 36 ("Criminal usury caps can provide an
outer limit to allowable interest rates.").
104. ALA. CODE § 5-18A-12 (2013).
105. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-A: 12 (2013).
106. Id.
107. Plunkett & Hurtado, supra note 101, at 50.
108. Id. at 51; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.4, 226.14, 226.22 (2014).
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Although the CFPB is currently not authorized to implement
usury caps,10 9 Congress itself employed caps when it passed the
Military Lending Act of 2007 and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
of 2010 ("SCRA").1"0 The Military Lending Act prohibits extending
consumer credit to military members or their dependents at an annual
percentage rate higher than thirty-six percent,1 1' and the SCRA limits
interest on debts incurred before military service (including student
loans) to six percent.11 2 Knowing violation of the SCRA is punishable by
a fine and up to one year of imprisonment, and violations of the Military
Lending Act can carry both civil and criminal penalties."1 3 In 2013, the
CFPB brought its first enforcement action against a payday lender for
violation of a cap,11 4 and in 2014, the Justice Department and FDIC
fined Sallie Mae and its former subsidiary $97 million for charging
excessive interest and late fees in violation of the SCRA."1 5
Federal legislators thus accept a usury cap as a viable means to
control consumer debt, at least in some circumstances. If Congress
deemed college students a class that ought to be protected, caps would
be an obvious means to limit the extent to which lenders like Sallie Mae
could take advantage of students to lend inexpensive capital at high
rates. Under a cap, private student loans would operate more like
federal student loans and promote equal access to education funding.
Nonetheless, there are some limitations to the benefits of usury
caps. First, there are differences in the structures of payday and
student loans. Payday loans are short-term loans in small amounts, and
although lenders often disregard ability to repay, the loans are secured
by the borrower's next paycheck. Student loans are borrowed in
substantially higher amounts and are unsecured. In many ways,
default risk is unpredictable since it is difficult to anticipate what a
student's employment will be by the time the loans come due years after

109. 12 U.S.C. § 5517(o) ("No provision of this title shall be construed as conferring authority
on the Bureau to establish a usury limit applicable to an extension of credit offered or made by a
covered person to a consumer, unless explicitly authorized by law.").
110. 10 U.S.C. § 987; 50 U.S.C. app. § 527.
111. 10 U.S.C. § 987(b).
112. 50 U.S.C. app. § 527(a)(1).
113. 10 U.S.C. § 987; 50 U.S.C. app. § 527.
114. Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau Takes Action Against Payday Lender for RoboSigning, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-takes-action-against-payday-lender-for-robosigning/, archived at http://perma.cc/8QFM-CL8L.
115. Tara Siegel Bernard, Sallie Mae to Pay Fine over Loans to Troops, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/your-money/sallie-mae-to-pay-fine-over-loans-to2014,
troops.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%5B%22RI%3A9%22%2C%22RI%3
A17%22%5D&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/5A7Q-LD4P.
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borrowing. In calculating a cap, legislators or regulators would likely
have to consider the long-term nature of student lending, which might
fluctuate with the job market, making it more difficult to find a single
reasonable figure.116
Further, in the face of increased regulation payday lenders have
developed new products to take advantage of legal loopholes that allow
them to continue lending with essentially the same rates and terms as
before.11 7 One scholar referred to payday loans as a "hydra," the
mythological creature that was able to grow two new heads each time
one of its nine was cut off."1 8 As long as lenders maintain relationships
with educational institutions and offer loans through financial aid
offices, this issue would likely be easy to control. However, in the face
of new regulation, private student lenders might depend more heavily
on direct-to-customer marketing so that they could offer new products
that circumvent the cap.
Finally, any regulation that will increase the cost to lenders will
decrease the number of student loans available."i9 Without readily
available funding, some potential students might not be able to seek a
degree at all. Since demand for higher education is high and education
access is a major concern for the current Administration, eliminating
access to student lending may contravene general social preferences
favoring equal opportunity.120
B. Government Refinancing of Private Student Loans
In 2014, Senator Elizabeth Warren introduced a bill that would
allow debtors with student loans to refinance to current federal student
loan interest rates.121 In the private loan context, the bill authorizes the

116. See infra Part IV.A for further discussion on the uncertain nature of student future
income.
117. Martin, supra note 98, at 593-94.
118. Id. at 592.
119. See generally Chris Cirillo, Note, Payday Loan Regulation: Any Interest?, 11 DEPAUL
Bus. & COM. L.J. 417 (2013). Cirillo argues that some regulatory measures, like disclosure, abilityto-repay assessment, and limits on mechanisms that allow consumers to extend payday loans, are
preferable to usury caps. These measures protect consumers by allowing them to read about and
understand their loans without substantially diminishing the supply of payday loans, which are
useful when used appropriately. Id.
120. Although the CFPB is currently not authorized to create usury caps, in its general
rulemaking authority the Bureau is specifically required to consider "the potential reduction of
access by consumers to consumer financial products or services resulting from such rule . . . ." 12
U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
121. Max Ehrenfreund, Sen. Elizabeth Warren Wants You to Be Able to Refinance Your
Student Loans, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (June 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
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federal government to assume existing private student loans and
refinance them to the interest rate applicable to federal loans originated
in 2013-2014.122 The bill requires that student debtors be in good
standing with their private lenders to qualify for the program. 23 Other
eligibility requirements would be left to the discretion of the Secretary
of Education, who would be charged with focusing on student debt-toincome ratio, "minimizing inequities" between refinanced private loans
and federal loans, and avoiding windfalls for private lenders. 1 2 4 The bill
narrowly lost a vote on the Senate floor and died in June 2014.121
Senator Warren's proposal appeared to address the access
problem relatively well. By providing an ex post solution for students
who took out loans with unfavorable terms, the bill did not restrict the
supply of private loans ex ante. Therefore, students who could only
afford to go to college by taking out private loans had that opportunity.
The Congressional Budget Office analysis of the bill predicted that the
Secretary's debt-to-income eligibility criteria, which would be
determined after the bill was in effect, would only preclude about five
percent of outstanding loans (federal and private), with "outstanding
loans" presumably including the ten percent of private loan debtors who
are in default.126 Refinancing under this model would apparently be
available to a large group of students.
However, the refinancing option might not change ex ante
incentives for private lenders because it does not directly regulate the
terms of new loans. First, only loans originated before July 1, 2013
would be eligible for Senator Warren's program.1 27 Thus, the program
would not directly affect future private loan terms. Second, even if the
program were extended to loans originated later, private lenders would
likely react to the program by designing financing products that allow
them to collect early in the life of the loan. If private lenders can make
strong profits by originating loans with high rates and fees and
collecting on them until the government assumes the loan, they are
blogs/wonkblog/wp/20 14/06/05/sen-elizabeth-warren-wants-you-to-be-able-to-refinance-yourstudent-loans/, archived at http://perma.cclRZ-7RAW.
122. S. 2432, 113th Cong. § 101(b)-(c) (2014).
123. Id. § 101(b).
124. Id.
125. See Danielle Douglas, Elizabeth Warren's Bill to Refinance Students Loans Dies in the
Senate. Now What?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (June 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wpI20 14/06/1 1/elizabeth-warrens-bill-to-refinance-student-loans-dies-in-senatenow-what/, archivedat http://perma.cc/HJ65-G3M4.
126. Letter from Douglas V. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Senator Elizabeth
Warren, Senator, Mass., 3 (June 6, 2014), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/s24321tr.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FD4H-U82E.
127. S. 2432, 113th Cong. (2014).
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unlikely to start originating consumer-friendly loans. The surging sales
of collateralized loan portfolios in 2005-2007 suggests that it can be
profitable to student lenders to originate loans and then sell them
before they are paid off.
The bill seemed to be a strong option for helping to cure the
staggering debt that students already face. Of course, since it did not
pass the Senate, the idea would need to be resurrected in Congress in
order to prove to be a viable solution. Furthermore, because of its ex
post nature, the refinancing option does not make long-term,
sustainable changes to how private loans are originated.
C. CFPBAuthority to Prevent Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Practices
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has statutory
authority to promulgate rules "as may be necessary or appropriate to
enable the Bureau to administer and carry out the purposes and
objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent
evasions thereof." 2 8 The CFPB also has authority to prevent "unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with any
transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or
service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service."1 29
The "unfair" and "deceptive" language matches the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and existing jurisprudence on the definition of
unfairness sets a high standard.1 30 To be unfair, a practice cannot be
128. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1) (2012).
129. Id. § 5531(b). In the fall of 2014, the CFPB sued two for-profit colleges that instituted
their own private lending programs to students. CFPB Sues For-Profit College Chain ITT for
Predatory
Lending,
CONSUMER
FIN,
PROT.
BUREAU
(Feb.
26,
2014),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-sues-for-profit-college-chain-itt-for-predatorylending/, archived at http://perma.cclV339-7FFY; CFPB Sues For-Profit CorinthianColleges for
Predatory Lending Scheme, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU
(Sept.
16,
2014),
http://www.consumerfinance.jov/newsroom/cfpb-sues-for-profit-corinthian-colleges-for-predatorylending-scheme/, archived at http://perma.cc/TBW8-S4WF. Among other charges, the CFPB
alleged violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act, namely that the lenders engaged in
unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. Complaint at 27-32, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT
Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-292 (S.D. Ind., Feb. 26, 2014), available at http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201402_cfpb-complaintITT.pdf; Complaint at 32-34, Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau v. Corinthian Colleges Inc., No. 14-7194 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2104), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb-complaint-corinthian.pdf. The outcomes of these
cases should provide some insight into courts' willingness to hold private student lenders liable for
their lending practices. However, the complaints are predominantly predicated upon the tactics
that the schools, which allegedly had relationships of trust with their students, used to coerce or
deceive students into taking on their financial products. See Complaint, ITTEduc. Servs., No. 1:14cv-292. Complaint at 32-34, CorinthianColleges, No. 14-7194. Thus, the terms of the loans are not
directly at issue.
130. Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 114 (2007) (testimony of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit
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easy for consumers to avoid. 131 Because the definition includes a
required cost-benefit analysis,1 32 lenders argue that the availability of
credit alone is a benefit substantial enough to put high-interest loans
outside the purview of unfairness.1 33 Hence, the CFPB might struggle
to regulate private lenders under the present legal definitions of
"unfair" or "deceptive."
Analysis of the statutory definition of "abusive" indicates that it
is more flexible.1 34 The definition reads as follows:
The Bureau shall have no authority under this section to declare an act or practice abusive
in connection with the provision of a consumer financial product or service, unless the act
or practice-(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or
condition of a consumer financial product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of-(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the material risks, costs,
or conditions of the product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in
selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in the
35
interests of the consumer.1

Some commentators suggest that the "abusive" standard was intended
to be more subjective than "unfair[ness]." These commentators suggest
that it was added to the Dodd-Frank Actin order to eliminate the costbenefit requirement and create a broader range of potential
regulation. 3 6
This potentially permissive standard (even without the
aforementioned ban on usury caps) might not allow the CFPB to affect
interest rates directly. Some student borrowers who submitted
complaints to the CFPB indicated that they were confused about
whether their loans were private or federal.1 37 If the CFPB can identify
private lender direct-to-customer marketing practices as "tak[ing]
Ins.
Corp.),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg37556/pdf/CHRG110hhrg37556.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8HFY-WDXL.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frankand ConsumerFinancialProtectionAct's
"Abusive"Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 120 (2011).
135. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2012).
136. Lee, supra note 134, at 120-21 (quoting FDIC Chairman Shiela Bair, speaking about the
same standard in the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, as saying: "'[A]busive'is a more
flexible standard . .. to address some of the practices that make us all uncomfortable." (alteration
in original)).
137. ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 8, at 11.
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unreasonable advantage of a lack of understanding on the part of the
consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or
service," the agency might be able to regulate loan marketing by
requiring school involvement. Since educational institutions provide a
buffer between students and lenders (and lenders often vie to be on a
school's "preferred lender list"), the schools themselves could provide
students information about the most affordable loans. This could
provide market pressure on lenders to reduce rates and eliminate
variable-rate options. 138
Loan availability and market forces would still drive interest
rates under this framework. However, incentivizing institutional
cooperation from the schools could help pressure private lenders to
improve the fairness of their practices. In August 2013, President
Obama released a proposal aiming to develop new rating standards for
colleges and universities. 139 The proposal provides financial incentives
for institutions that lower costs-the ratings, which would incorporate
information about each institution's ease of access and affordability,
would be tied to federal aid distribution. 140 To encourage schools to take
on a facilitation responsibility with respect to private loans, similar
funding incentives could be offered to schools that partner with lenders
offering fixed, comparatively low interest rate products.
D. MortgageRegulation as a Model for Private Student Lending
A number of analogies might be made between the mortgage
lending market and private student lending. 14 1 First, going to college
and purchasing a home are generally considered a part of the "American
dream," commodities that are so highly valued that Americans are
willing to take on significant debt to acquire them. The markets also
share an important similarity: both lending types experienced a boom
in the mid-2000s, yielding large subprime lending markets that later
left many borrowers in default.1 42 However, while private student
lending benefited only incrementally from increased disclosure
regulations, mortgage lending received much regulatory attention since

138. Current statutes already prohibit educational institutions from accepting benefits from
private lenders in exchange for a place on the preferred lender list. 15 U.S.C. § 1650.
139. Release, The White House, supra note 5.
140. Id. The President expects federal aid funding incentives to be effective because schools
rely on student ability to borrow $150 billion per year from the government in order to afford
higher education. See id.
141. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 13 (highlighting a number of similarities).
142. See supra Part II.B.
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the crisis.14 3 Mortgage lending regulation could plausibly inform
statutory and regulatory measures that could promote private student
loan affordability.
1. "High-Cost" Loans: Increased Disclosure and Unfavorable
Term Restrictions
The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994
("HOEPA") defines a class of "high-cost mortgages" by instituting
interest-rate cutoffs.1 4 4 The CFPB has some authority to reevaluate the
cutoffs periodically but is limited by a discrete statutory range. 145 The
statute and corresponding rules in Regulation Z require increased
disclosure for high-cost loans "in conspicuous type size." 4 6 For example,
high-cost, variable-rate loans must include disclosure of the maximum
possible annual percentage rate 4 7 and the maximum possible monthly
payment based on said rate. 148 Disclosure must also include the
following statement, verbatim:
You are not required to complete this agreement merely because you have received these
disclosures or have signed a loan application. If you obtain this loan, the lender will have
a mortgage on your home. You could lose your home, and any money you have put into it,
1 49
if you do not meet your obligations under the loan.

A similar disclosure structure could be applied to high-cost private
student loans.
In addition to heightened disclosure requirements, high-cost
mortgages are prohibited from carrying specified consumer-unfriendly
terms, such as certain penalties for prepayment, increased interest
rates after default, and negative amortization.1 50 Limiting such terms
in the high-cost context helps to protect consumers and diminishes the
profitability of these products, helping to level the playing field between
low-interest and high-interest loans. This framework could benefit
143. See, e.g., Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108
Stat. 2190 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Truth in Lending (Regulation
Z), 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2014).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(bb). Although the concept of the statute has remained the same, several
amendments have been made over time, including some made pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act.
Mercedes Kelley Tunstall, CFPBMoves to Broaden Scope of "High-Cost"Mortgages, 66 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 390, 390 (2012). Note that the current cutoffs (6.5 percent or 8.5 percent) are higher
than recent interest-rate averages for mortgages (4.1 percent for a thirty-year mortgage). 15 U.S.C.
§ 1602(bb); Gordon, supra note 32.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(bb)(2).
146. Id. § 1639(a)(1) (2012); 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.30, 1026.32(c).
147. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.30.
148. Id. § 1026.32(c)(4).
149. Id. § 1026.32(c)(1).
150. Id. § 1026.32(d).
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student borrowers in the same manner that it benefits mortgagors.
Allowing high-cost loans to persist with increased regulation, as
opposed to imposing a usury cap, would mitigate some concerns about
regulations decreasing the total volume of education financing
available.151

2. Ability to Repay
On January 10, 2014, a new CFPB regulation called the Ability
to Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in
Lending Act became an effective part of Regulation Z.152 Under the rule,
most mortgages (not just high-cost mortgages) require lenders to
employ an eight-factor analysis to make a "reasonable and good faith
determination" of the borrower's projected ability to repay before
originating a new loan. 153 The factors include the borrower's
employment status, anticipated income or assets, credit history, other
various financial obligations, debt-to-income ratio, and the expected
monthly payment on the mortgage.1 54 The expected monthly payment
must be calculated based on the mortgage's highest possible interest
rate. 55 Remedies for Truth in Lending Act violations include a private
or class right of action and a defense to foreclosure.156
The Qualified Mortgage component of the CFPB's recent
regulation allows mortgages that meet heightened standards to enjoy a
"safe harbor" presumption of compliance with the ability-to-repay
determination.15 7 Among other requirements, Qualified Mortgages
have limited fees, offer relatively equal payments throughout the life of
the mortgage, are underwritten using the maximum interest rate but

151. While restricting the range of possible terms would likely decrease private student loan
availability to some extent because disallowing consumer-unfriendly terms would increase the cost
to lenders, availability would arguably not suffer as much as it would under a usury cap, which
would disallow loans at these rates entirely. Cf. Tunstall, supranote 144, at 391 (stating that very
few HOEPA high-cost mortgages are available because of the regulations; between 2004 and 2010,
the percent of HOEPA mortgages originated dropped from 0.4 percent to 0.06 percent).
152. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43; Ability to Repay and QualifiedMortgage Standards Underthe Truth
in Lending Act, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations/

ability-to-repay-and-qualified-mortgage-standards-under-the-truth-in-lending-act-regulation-z/.
153. Id.; see also Michael B. Mierzewski et al., CFPBFinalizes Ability-to-Repay and Qualified
Mortgage Rule, 130 BANKING L.J. 611 (2013) (providing a summary of the ability-to-repay and
qualified mortgage safe harbor components of the rule).
154. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(2).
155. Id. § 1026.43(c)(5).
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a), (k) (2012).
157. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e). Here, the rule distinguishes higher-priced mortgages. Higherpriced mortgages that meet the qualified mortgage standards only benefit from a rebuttable
presumption of ability-to-pay compliance, not the safe harbor. Id.
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allow the loan to be paid off during its term, and cannot exceed a
specified
debt-to-income
ratio.16 8 Income calculations
assess
employment for the two years preceding the mortgage as well as the
likelihood of employment for the subsequent three years. 5 9 The safe
harbor provides lenders with greater assurances that they will not be
liable for failing to make a good faith and reasonable ability-to-repay
determination.16 0 It also might decrease compliance costs associated
with making an individual ability-to-repay analysis for every new loan
applicant. 161
Some consider the new rule to function like a veiled usury law.1 6 2
By disallowing mortgages that consumers are unlikely to be able to
repay, the rule functionally caps both the total amount borrowed and
interest rates on an individual basis. Professor Adam Levitin
acknowledges that ability-to-repay requirements are paternalistic; they
will prohibit access to people who cannot afford high-cost loans.1 63
However, Professor Levitin argues that, in today's world of complex
mortgage-lending regulation, the safe harbor rule is good for lenders
because it is predictable and therefore easier to administer.1 64
Because the rule has only recently taken effect, its efficacy in
driving more responsible lending and borrowing is essentially untested.
However, the structure of requiring stricter lending requirements and
providing remedies for loans that fail the requirements might help to
decrease troublesome student lending.
IV. A PROPOSED PLAN FOR PRIVATE STUDENT LENDING
Each of the measures analyzed in Part III can assist in
identifying values and concerns about student lending and education
access. However, by compiling a plan that utilizes components of the
various frameworks, students may be better served. This Section

158. Id.
159. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026, app. Q.
160. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ABILITY-TO-REPAY AND QUALIFIED MORTGAGE RULE:
SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE 28 (2014), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/

201401_cfpb-atr-qm-small-entity-compliance-guide.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3V35-W9SJ.
161. See id. at 15-24 (noting that lenders must use "reasonably reliable third-party records"
to calculate ability-to-repay and providing guidance on what that individualized determination
should entail).
162. Adam Levitin, Usury Laws Are Dead. Long Live the New Usury Law. The CFPB'sAbility
to Repay Mortgage Rule, CREDIT SLIPS (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/
0 1/usury-laws-are-dead-long-live-the-new-usury-law-the-cfpbs-ability-to-repay-mortgagerule.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S7YF-ZHDF.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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proposes short- and long-term regulatory action to promote healthy
student lending.
A. Long-Term Strategy: Ability-to-Repay Model
In the long term, the ability-to-repay and qualified-loan model
has strong potential for solving issues associated with private student
loans. Requiring private student lenders to assess ability to repay will
decrease default rates by prohibiting students from overborrowing. If
college graduates enter the job market with loans that they can
realistically pay back, the decreased consumerism discussed in Part I
can be prevented. If an ability-to-repay calculation were required before
initiating any new private student loan, a qualified-loan safe harbor
(like the one discussed in Part III.D.2) would be attractive to lenders
when it would decrease compliance costs.
The first step in establishing an ability-to-repay model would be
to create and refine an ability-to-repay formula to apply to student
lending. 165 Regulators can look to existing data 166 but would need to
identify predictors of future income, collect or refine data on those
predictors, and design a study to evaluate the efficacy of the formula.
Once the formula was complete, an infrastructure for collecting and
disseminating the necessary information between students, schools,
and lenders would have to be implemented. Thus, development would
likely entail a substantial commitment of time and resources.
In developing the formula, regulators could import some of the
factors developed to prevent a repeat of the mortgage crisis, such as
existing debts and obligations, expected monthly payments at the
maximum interest rate, and credit history. 167 While some personal
financial history factors are easily translatable from the mortgage
context to the student-loan context, other factors are more speculative.
Notably, to determine ability to repay, regulators would need to find an

165. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 78 (acknowledging that student
lending is more complex than other consumer lending because it cannot rely on credit history and
income).
166. The CFPB has suggested some proxies for ability to repay in this context. Id. at 79. For
example, "there are some statistics that may be correlated with the value of a degree from a
particular school." Id. Further, some private lenders have used a school's "Cohort Default Rate" as
an indicator of ability to repay. Id. The Cohort Default Rate for a particular school reflects the
percentage of federal student borrowers during a period of time who enter repayment and default.
Id. Cohort Default Rate is currently used to determine whether a school is eligible to receive federal
loan funding. Id.
167. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026, app. Q (2014). Although many students do not have substantial credit
history or debt, those factors should be considered for students who do.
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accurate method of predicting future income for students who have yet
to secure (or even apply for) jobs. Here, the concrete, contemporaneous
employment data used for mortgage lending would not apply,
necessitating a heavy reliance upon long-term employment
projections.16 8
Regulators could use an amalgam of preexisting tools to predict
graduate employment and earnings. For example, the Census Bureau
tracks work-life earnings by bachelor's degree, which could serve as an
ability-to-repay predictor for students who select a field of study before
originating their loans.1 69 The Department of Labor collects earnings
and unemployment data based on educational attainment.1 70 Especially
in today's economic climate, institutions themselves may collect data
indicating how many of their graduates are gainfully employed.1 7 1
Additionally, individual achievement data personal to the student, such
as high school GPA or standardized testing scores, might help to project
a borrower's likelihood of graduating and becoming employed.1 72
Although the speculative nature of many of these factors and the
dependence of the job market generally on the economy could make the
formula less predictive than the current mortgage formula, it could help
stem lending to students who will likely not be able to repay their loans.

168. Such as expected future income and assets. Id.
169. Educational Attainment, Pathways After a Bachelor's Degree, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/library/infographics/pathways-series.html
archived at http://perma.cc/
6E3Z-XVQX. The data is divided by the subject matter of the bachelor's degree but also looks to
earnings of holders of those degrees based on their professions and any post-secondary education.
Id. That students often change their courses of study would undermine the efficacy of this predictor
without some sort of refinancing mechanism if a student changed majors.
170. Earningsand Unemployment Rates by EducationalAttainment, supra note 1.
171. This would, of course, require that institutions report such data accurately and in detail.
In the last several years, many institutions (notably, law schools and for-profit colleges) have faced
scrutiny for reporting job statistics that mislead students about the type of position or amount of
compensation that they can expect to receive. See, e.g., Stephen Burd, New Disclosures Show
What's Wrong with For-Profit College Job Placement Rates, EDCENTRAL (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.edcentral.org/new-gainful-employment-data-shows-whats-wrong-profit-college -jobplacement-rates/, archived at http://perma.cc/AW7R-2KKK (providing some examples of
employment data manipulation by for-profit colleges and calling for a single federal standard for
reporting such data); Christine Parker, NY Law Schools Inflate Job Figures: Critics, N.Y. POST,
Mar. 11, 2012, http://nypost.com/2012/03/11/ny-law-schools-inflate-job-figures-critics/, archived at
http://perma.cc/S6ZZ-Q32G (breaking down employment statistics at New York area law schools
after requesting details on how the figures are calculated).
172. Since student financial aid packages are adjusted annually, lenders could also consider
college performance after the first year to hone ability to repay. However, this might create
undesirable consequences. Some students who did not perform well in a particular academic year
could become ineligible for future lending, which would leave students with student debt but no
ability to continue seeking their degrees.
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An ability-to-repay formula could benefit individual borrowers
while providing broader positive effects on funding higher education.
First, the credit-history-based factors (borrowed from mortgage
lending) would promote valuable lender-school information sharing,
which generally prevents students from borrowing in excess of the cost
of attendance. To determine students' other debts, private lenders
would have to work with schools or the federal government to learn the
amount of federal loans being accessed. Via lender-school
communication, schools can also better monitor who is borrowing, and
financial aid offices can be in contact with students seeking private
loans to help them make sure that they have exhausted federal loans.
Second, by calculating ability to repay based on a student's
academic performance and the outlook of the degree he or she wishes to
pursue, class-based access might be tempered by more merit-based
factors. Although assets and credit history will clearly still be important
components of underwriting standards, introducing more forwardlooking factors into creditworthiness might diminish their effects. Thus,
loan access would be less dependent on whether a student could provide
a viable cosigner and on the financial condition of the student's family.
This method will deny access to education to some potential
students who do not have the credit histories and the academic and
career outlooks to secure loans and pay for their educations. Although
this paternalism can be seen as suppressing the American dream, its
application in the mortgage industry suggests that this is a value
judgment that Americans are ready to make in a similar, highly valued
context. Assisting citizens in determining whether higher education is
going to be an individually profitable endeavor might help more than it
hurts. Although some cases will likely seem unfair, the overarching goal
would be to move towards maximizing access while avoiding foreseeable
default for those who would be better off not seeking higher education
at the time they apply.
B. Short-Term Strategy
Because the ability-to-repay formula would take some time to
develop and implement, in the interim, two of the other measures
discussed in Part III can provide students some assistance borrowing
affordably.
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1. Partner with the Institution
First, a plan similar to the President's proposed rating system1 73
should be used to tie federal loan funding to schools that partner with
preferred lenders offering loans below a certain rate. This system would
reward educational institutions that direct their students towards
favorable loans and incentivize other institutions to do the same. Since
federal loan funding is already allocated to schools, this proposal only
requires reallocation of existing funds based on cooperation and does
not subsidize for-profit lenders. Existing regulations prohibit lenders
from bribing schools to be included on a preferred lender list, so private
lenders could not legally compensate the schools to forego the federal
funding.
Educational institutions are ideal intermediaries. They are in
direct contact with students, so they provide an effective marketing
channel for private lenders. If they work both with private lenders and
the CFPB, they can act as watchdogs for each of their students to limit
overborrowing.1 7 4 While it avoids imposing a usury cap, setting a
maximum preferred lender rate sends a clear message about what is
affordable and provides a clear benefit to lending at that rate; this
partnership structure would reward preferred lenders with access to
borrowers and school endorsements. It would not, however, eliminate
direct-to-customer marketing, which could still lead to overborrowing
or accepting high-cost private loans before exhausting federal loans.
Nonetheless, the continued use of some direct-to-customer marketing
here could provide a sort of silver lining from an access perspective:
while students would hopefully find the most affordable options first,
higher-cost options would still be available.
2. Implement Strong and Clear Warnings
Second, a warning similar to the one presented in Part III.D.1
should be required for high-cost private student loans. However, some
adjustments to the existing mortgage warning could make the nature
of the disclosure even clearer to students. In the mortgage context, the
mandated warning language attempts to alert consumers to the
potential unfavorable outcome: borrowers could lose their homes. 7 5

173. Release, The White House, supra note 5.
174. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 18, at 89-90 (suggesting that Congress
require private lenders secure a school certification of a borrower's need for private loans before
such loan may be issued, but not suggesting tying any incentive to the requirement).
12 C.F.R. § 1026.32(c)(1) (2014).
175.
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Although it was probably designed to attract borrower attention,
instead of highlighting the unfavorable quality of the mortgage at hand
compared to other products on the market (its cost), the warning merely
identifies the potential negative outcome of all mortgages. If the goal is
to encourage students to consider lower-cost loans, the warning should
also be about the rate itself.
Regulation Z already requires a number of disclosures specific to
private education loans.1 76 Private lenders must inform students that
federal loans might be available and identify contemporary federal loan
interest rates.1 77 However, the regulations leave it to borrowers to
compare interest rates on their own. To help students understand
whether they are receiving an expensive financing option, the CFPB
should define a "high-cost student loan" and implement corresponding
disclosure requirements; if a loan meets the definition of "high cost,"
lenders should have to display an additional warning that directly
explains to borrowers that their loans are expensive compared to other
financial products (both public and private). Such a warning could help
identify healthy interest rates for student loans without implementing
an impermissible usury cap.
For example, the following language could supplement the
benefits of disclosing federal interest rates by clearly and concisely
articulating that less expensive loans may be available:
Because the interest rate of this loan exceeds [decided-upon rate codified by regulation]
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) considers this product to be a highcost private student loan. Student loans are not typically dischargeable in
bankruptcyl78 and you will be responsible for repaying this loan regardless of
your future income and whether you complete your degree. The CFPB
recommends that you consider the interest rates and repayment terms of federal and
private student loan alternatives to find the most affordable loan available before making
the commitment to borrow.

The warning should also include some statistics about the
amount of high-interest student debt in default. As in the mortgage
warning, information about the potential outcome of high-cost
borrowing can help students (who are likely novice borrowers)
understand the consequences that frequently befall students who
accept expensive loans. Including specific information, such as
statistics, would serve as a concrete indicator that the student should
proceed cautiously before accepting the loan.
See id. § 226.47.
176.
177.
Id. §§ 226.47(a)(6)(i)-(ii), (b)(4)(i)-(ii).
Regulation Z currently requires disclosure that borrowers may still have to pay back
178.
private student loans in bankruptcy, id.§§ 226.47(a)(3)(iv), (b)(3)(vi); however, this warning
proposes joining that information with disclosures that the loan at issue is high-cost and with
information about defaults by high-cost borrowers.
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If displayed prominently, a warning like this one could help
students understand that there are a variety of interest-rate options
and loan types to consider. Since most consumers would probably seek
to avoid a high-cost option, students would likely look into other options
once notified that they might be available. In times where underwriting
standards are high, a student may not qualify for a loan with a lower
rate. However, a warning like this one would help provide that student
the opportunity to shop for other options and make an informed decision
about whether the benefit of the degree is worth the debt load and the
risk of default. The proposed warning, designed to be clearer and to
provide a loan-cost benchmark, should be displayed prominently, where
the student is most likely to see it. Since many financial transactions
now take place online, regulators could also consider warning delivery
methods that would appeal to students, such as mandatory videos or
infographics. Since most students are novice borrowers and
inexperienced with contracts, they might be more likely to pay attention
to visual media than to read "the fine print," even when the message is
presented in very large print.179
Disclosure requirements are already plentiful. Ideally, by
offering students a discrete benchmark by which to compare the costs
of their loans, students can also make informed decisions regarding
whether the decision to go to school is worth accepting a high-cost loan.
Further, by including information about the amount of high-cost debt
in default, students might better understand that those risks are very
real when students consume expensive financial products.
V. CONCLUSION
As the cost of higher education continues to climb, students have
demonstrated how much they value that education by borrowing in
correspondingly high amounts. While it is prudent to explore means of
bringing costs down, it is important to recognize that, even if a degree
comes at a lower cost, many Americans will still need to access student
loans. Although federal student loans serve many American students,
private student lending meets the excess demand. This form of lending
can be considerably less affordable because of its high and variable

172. There is substantial academic literature on how to make regulatory warnings more
effective. The exact location and format of this warning are beyond the scope of this Note. For a
summary of research regarding effective warnings, see, for example, Michael S. Wogalter, Vincent
C. Conzola & Tonya L. Smith-Jackson, Research-Based Guidelines for Warning Design and
Evaluation, 33 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 219 (2002), available at http://www.who.int/fetc/guidelines/
ArtElevenWogalterNine.pdf, archived at http://perma.cclK5ZN-85FP.
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interest rates. Especially during times of economic prosperity, lending
standards have been relaxed, yielding massive default. This Note
proposes a strategy to curb the price of private student lending.
First, in the long term, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau should develop an ability-to-repay and qualified-loan structure
for private student loans similar to the one developed for the mortgage
industry. This system would require the CFPB to develop a formula
that predicts future student income. Lenders would then use that
formula to determine whether a loan applicant would be likely to be
able to afford repayment after graduation. Although a formula would
likely be time-consuming to develop, it could help prevent students from
taking out loans that they will ultimately default on. Under this regime,
lenders could also develop qualified loans with favorable terms that
could be offered without assessing an applicant's ability to repay. By
incentivizing lenders to save on the costs of individual calculations, the
CFPB would encourage the private student loan market to offer more
favorable terms and rates from the outset.
Second, in the short term, the federal government should
condition federal loan funding on higher education institutions'
cooperation in facilitating lender-student relationships when lenders
offer affordable loans. By requiring that preferred lender-school
relationships are only cultivated when loans are affordable, schools can
direct students who have exhausted federal options toward a loan with
a reasonable rate. These relationships will also yield information
sharing that will help schools and private lenders protect against
overborrowing. Presently, many private lenders confirm with schools
that a loan recipient is indeed enrolled and that the student is not
borrowing in excess of the school's cost of attendance. However, lenders
are doing so of their own volition in response to the recession and could
revert to more direct-to-customer marketing practices should
underwriting standards loosen.
Third, the CFPB should promulgate a rule defining high-cost
student loans and requiring clear warnings to appear on agreements for
those loans. The warnings should inform students, first, that the loan
is high cost, second, that lower-cost options (both federal and private)
may be available, and, third, that educational debt is rarely
dischargeable in bankruptcy. Students are often not savvy borrowers,
and a clear, comparative warning would likely incentivize them to
pursue other loan options before agreeing to an expensive debt load.
In conjunction, these measures could simultaneously push the
private student loan market toward more affordable products and
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inform students about their best options before borrowing. Although
this may result in some paternalism that decreases education access,
the scheme could ultimately help achieve the underlying goal of
preventing default-a goal that students, regulators, and lenders
should share.
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